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Abstrak  
Makalah ini berfokus pada meneliti tentang transformasi aktivisme Islam di Sumatera Utara 
terutama gerakan mereka, yang didengungkan oleh Aksi Bela Islam di Jakarta 2016, di wilayah ini 
pasca-hukuman Basuki Tjahaja Purnama di tahun antara 2017 dan 2018. Studi ini menganalisis 
gerakan mereka dalam menjaga narasi politik, wacana Islam yang diintimidasi, dan kemudian 
semua ini telah dikapitalisasi untuk kepentingan politik dalam pemilihan daerah seperti pemilihan 
gubernur di Sumatera Utara 2018. Studi ini didekati dengan teori gerakan sosial, gerakan sosial 
Islam, dan kemudian menjadi terkait dengan proyek demokratisasi dan narasi kontemporer 
nasionalisme Indonesia. Studi ini berpendapat bahwa pertama, gerakan ini masih bergerak lebih 
lama daripada yang diprediksi banyak sarjana karena kemampuan mereka untuk menjaga wacana 
dan menganalisis peluang struktur politik. Kedua, fragmentasi dalam tubuh gerakan tidak dapat 
dihindari karena disorientasi kerja dan hubungannya dengan elit politik dan politik elektoral. Ketiga, 
bayang-bayang keberadaan gerakan ini tetap menjadi tantangan besar bagi proyek demokratisasi di 
Sumatera Utara dan umumnya Indonesia. 
Kata Kunci: Gerakan Sosial, Elit Politik, Demokratisasi. 
 
Abstract 
This paper focus on examining the transformation of Islamic activism in North Sumatra especially their 
movement, which was echoed by the Aksi Bela Islam in Jakarta 2016, in this region in post- punishment of 
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama between 2017 and 2018. The study analyses their movement in keeping the narration 
of politics, discourse of intimidated Islam, and then all these have been capitalised for political interest in 
regional election such as governor election in North Sumatra 2018. The study is approached by social 
movement theory, Islamic social movement, and then being related to the project of democratization and the 
contemporary narration of Indonesia nationalism. This study argues that firstly, this movement is still going 
on move longer than many scholar predicted because their ability to keep discourse and analize political 
structure opportunity. Secondly, fragmentation in the body of movement can not be avoided because working 
disorientation and their relation with political elit and electoral politics. Third, the shadow of this movement 
existence remains a big challenge for democratization project in North Sumatra and generally Indonesia. 
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  The 2016 Islamic Defendant 
Action Movement (Aksi Bela Islam) in 
Jakarta demanding punishment for 
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) for 
blaspheming the Koran is a phenomenal 
movement. Although similar movements 
are not new in Indonesia and especially 
in Muslim-majority countries in the 
world, this movement has a unique side 
such as Peace Action and echoes to 
various parts of Indonesia. Many 
observers consider that the Islamic 
solidarity movement, which is 
voluminous Islamic Defensive Action, 
does not last long, one of the reasons 
being the assumption that the movement 
is a short-term political movement, 
namely the 2016 Jakarta Election, 
furthermore, this movement will end 
when the Ahok verdict demands 
applying inclusion. Although in some 
areas confirmation can be obtained of 
this assumption, but this situation is 
different from what happened in North 
Sumatra. This movement is gaining 
momentum for several reasons. First, 
since the beginning of the Islamic 
solidarity movement at the end of 2016, 
North Sumatra was in fact an area that 
made a big noise. Secondly, a similar 
situation had been experienced by 
Muslims in Medan when the Medan 
regional election in 2010. At that time, 
one of the figures competing in the 
Pilkada was Sofyan Tan, this figure got 
resistance from Islam because he was of 
ethnic Chinese, religious Christian, and 
supported by PDIP. Third, there are 
regional head elections at the provincial 
and district levels which are 
simultaneously carried out here. 
Incidentally, the figures who participated 
in this event were figures identified as 
people who were attached to the Basuki 
Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) figure, Djarot 
Saiful Hidayat, former deputy governor 
of DKI Jakarta during Ahok's leadership 
and returning in pairs in the DKI 2017 
Pilgub. Muslim resistance more and 
more because they assume that Djarot is 
a figure who is equally troubled when 
leading Jakarta, then, this situation 
provides new opportunities for Islamic 
movements such as North Sumatra 
GNPF and GAPAI SU to do long work as 
in the Ahok case in Jakarta.  
 
This study wants to explore how the 
movements of this movement maintain 
the discourse they build that is useful for 
prolonging the life of the movement, 
maintaining tension and caring for 
support from Muslim supporters. 
Definition and Theory of Social 
Movements 
 
To facilitate the operation of a 
comprehensive discussion and 
understanding in this chapter we will 
parse the definition of the Social 
Movement and the theoretical debate 
among theorists about developing 
approaches in this matter, including 
specifically the theory of Islamic social 
movements. These theories were also 
reviewed and discussed, then tested and 
used in approaching the phenomenon of 
social movements from the Anti-
Blasphemy Movement of North 
Sumatra. 
 
Social movements are understood 
as a group of people or organizations 
that are diffusely organized that strive 
towards common goals related to human 
society or social change. In addition, 
social movements are loosely organized 
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but sustainable campaigns to support 
social goals, usually the application or 
prevention of changes in the structure or 
value of societies. Although social 
movements differ in size, all are 
basically collective in nature, and that is, 
they come together spontaneously but 
the relationship is not defined by rules 
and procedures but only sharing 
common views in society. 
 
All definitions of social 
movements reflect the idea that social 
movements are intrinsically related to 
social change. They do not cover the 
activities of people as members of stable 
social groups with established structures 
and norms and values that are 
undoubted. Member behavior of social 
movements does not reflect the 
assumption that the social order will 
continue as it is. This reflects, conversely, 
the belief that people collectively can 
bring or prevent social change if they 
will dedicate themselves to pursuing 
goals. Non-committed observers may 
regard these goals as illusions, but for 
their members is a hope that is quite 
capable of being realized. Social 
movements are not everyday 
movements, habits, but behaviors that 
are influenced by the purpose of the 
movement that is to bring changes in the 
way things "always" have been done or 
sometimes prevent changes. 
 
Some of the main theories of 
social movements have been put 
forward for years and how these theories 
can explain the birth and growth and or 
dissolution of certain social movements. 
Here also we can see how some of these 
theories run in dealing with social 
movements of the internet era, such as 
the controversial anti-globalization 
movement. In the theory of deprivation, 
some social movements are born when 
certain people or certain groups of 
people feel that they do not have certain 
goods, services, or resources (McAdam, 
McCarthy, & Zald, 1988). Some Islamic 
circles, especially those belonging to the 
ABI movement feel that their rights are 
not fulfilled by the current regime. The 
rights they perceive as the right to 
express the values and teachings of 
Islam are not accommodated by the 
present government. However, this 
movement presupposes the struggle for 
resources. They consider that Islamic 
mastery in terms of resources is 
considered very minimal because the 
allocation and distribution of resources 
is more controlled by people who they 
consider to be agents of liberal 
capitalism and Chinese communism. 
The term "resources" in this context 
refers to things such as money, labor, 
social status, knowledge, media support 
and political elites, and so on. 
 
One of the great advantages of 
this theory is that it offers a convincing 
explanation of why in some situation 
some complaints can give birth to 
successful social movements, whereas in 
other situations the same type of 
complaint may not produce anything 
similar. However, there are social 
movements that are born even when 
resources are especially scarce (Starr, 
2000), Starr discusses in detail how many 
"new" social movements are categorized 
by many under the umbrella term 
"antiglobalization movement" trying to 
mobilize resources power, especially 
human resources, by submitting 
requests to grassroots organizers. These 
grassroots organizers first tried to gather 
workers in their area, then to unite them 
in mid-level regional meetings, and 
finally organize protests (and even 
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boycotts) at the national and 
international levels. Now mobilization 
models for such protests have almost 
shifted to the presence and 
extraordinary influence of modern 
technology (the Internet, cell phones). 
Petitions, protests and claims are 
mobilized through websites. 
 
The next theory is the theory of 
political processes. This concept treats 
social movements as a type of political 
movement in which the origins of social 
movements are traced to the availability 
of political opportunities. More 
precisely, this theory sees social 
movements in question to the state or 
responsible governmental powers. If the 
government's position is deeply rooted 
and also vulnerable to repressive 
behavior, it is likely that social 
movements may fail. Conversely, if the 
government is weak or more tolerant of 
differences in attitudes, it is likely that 
every social movement born may have 
the opportunity to grow and develop 
(Dobson, 2001). However, the main 
problem with this political process 
theory is that this approach emphasizes 
the importance of political conditions 
and companion political opportunities in 
determining opportunities for success 
for newborn social movements. 
 
In the Islamic movement 
discourse some literature proposes 
different terms and may be conceptually 
close together. The term Islamic 
movement has been generalized as 
Islamism. Islamism appears to have a 
variety of representations and is used to 
describe the phenomenon of its 
complexity. For example, the term 
Islamic fundamentalism which is 
interpreted as a big paying of many 
terms including 'Islamic movements',' 
Islamic politics', 'Islamic activism', 
'Islamic revival' or 'revivalism', and 'neo-
political religious movements', and' 
Islamism ' (Bayat, 2005). The concept of 
fundamentalism emphasizes the essence 
of literal interpretation. This pattern 
emphasizes the traditionalism of the 
movement. In different versions 
fundamentalism is a belief in exclusive 
poses of a unique truth (Gellner, 2013). 
The alternative term for fundamentalism 
is neo-political religion or "new religious 
politics". This term was proposed by 
Keddie to make it more neutral and 
clearly distinguish between politics and 
the weight of the movement (Keddie, 
1998). In addition, there is also the term 
'Revivalism' or 'resurgence' which 
emphasizes that religion is loaded with 
political content in this movement. In the 
context of the term 'political Islam', this 
is meant for an Islamic movement that 
emphasizes their political nature. 
Islamism is sometimes released by 
Islamic circles, even though state control 
over people's lives and almost every 
practice of Islamic life in their families, 
schools and other public spaces becomes 
political. 
 
Finally, the term 'Islamic 
activism', which is meant to see and take 
into account the inclusion of various 
types of activities, political, social and 
cultural, which appear under the rubric 
of the Islamic movement (Bayat, 2005). 
The concept, said Bayat, has no 
specificity to point to the recent increase 
in actions in Indonesia. Discourse 
analysis of texts, words and symbols can 
explain the methodological orientation 
that applies to discover the nature of the 
Islamist movement. And many 
'fundamentalist' arguments get their raw 
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material from this type of data. They 
tend to recognize Islam as a religion and 
Islamism as a political project by 
ignoring variations over time in the 
perception of religion, practices and 
institutions among various segments of 
the population in certain societies and 
between different Muslim countries. A 
dynamic and changing view of 
movement is often overshadowed by 
static vision. The Islamist movement is 
often presented as a very homogeneous 
and coherent social unit that must be 
identified by their ideological discourse. 
There is little interest in dissecting 
movements to uncover the layers and 
orientation of their constituents. Many 
Islamic narratives treat it simply in terms 
of religious revivalism, expressions of 
primordial loyalty, or as something 
unique and unique that conventional 
social science cannot analyze. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1. Type of Research 
This study uses a type of discursive 
approach. The researcher chose to use this 
approach because it has been considered 
more representative of the variety of 
movement narratives that became a 
subset in it. It is also considered 
appropriate in exploring the meaning of 
people's behavior as a dynamic 
community, the development of their 
movements from one moment to another. 
 
2. Data Collection 
There are several steps that I have taken 
in collecting data, including; a) 
Observation: our observation activities 
were carried out among others by 
following and seeing several 
organizational meetings and 
demonstrations in the field, seeing 
activities, listening to speeches, and 
responding to the demonstrators in this 
process; b) interviews, which we 
conducted was in-depth interviews with 
several figures who were members of the 
GNPF and GAPAI SU. In addition, we 
also conducted interviews with 
supporters of this movement. In this 
work, we talked a number of times when 
the demonstration took place, another 
time a light conversation was held at a 
mosque and coffee shop. In terms of 
helping to record data and information 
when observing and interviewing, we use 
tools here such as voice recorder 
applications on smartphones, photos and 
stationery; c) Our document studies are 
carried out on program reports, leaflets 
circulating in action, meeting documents, 
and the like. All of these are very useful 
to expand and to sharp the analysis of the 
discourse developed by the GAPAI elites 
to its supporters. 
 
3. Data management 
After the data been collected, the next 
activity is to process the data which is 
classifying, correlating and filtering it out. 
The results are then adjusted to the 
discussion plan and research objectives. 
 
4. Analysis of data 
Data analysis was carried out with a 
discursive approach. In this case the 
theory of discourse analysis is used to 
look at Islamic political discourse 
developed in the social movement. 
Methodologically this step follows the 
method of Manuel Castells which 
emphasizes that social movements must 
be seen by "their own discourse". When 
presenting and analyzing movements, I 
will follow very closely their own words, 
not just ideas, as recorded in the 
document where I work, because, like 
Castells, the identity of the movement is 
spoken by those who speak. The Castell 
method is useful beyond the structuralist 
position he has followed by deducing the 
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nature of the movement from the location 
of the actor class, by looking on the 
contrary to what they actually say they 
want. However, this kind of discourse 
analysis has its own drawbacks, raising 
some difficult questions. Given the 
fragmented nature of contemporary 
movements, who speaks for those 
movements? Is it Ideologists, leaders, 
various layers of constituents? Most 
accounts are restricted by relying solely 
on the language of ideologists. Another 
problem is how to distinguish what the 
speaker means by what they say, 
especially in times of transition and 
uncertainty when words can have many 
meanings. In addition, later, the theory of 
Islamic activism of Asef Bayat was also 
operated to examine the structure of 
motion, polarization, and fragmentation 
that worked in the Islamic movement. 
Furthermore, we use the political 
opportunity structure theory approach as 
one of the established theories of social 
movements, to see how the movement 
plays in looking at the political 
opportunities provided by the structural 
environment. 
Fabrication of Religious Issues 
 
Why can a movement last longer 
than expected? How can SU GAP and 
GNPF maintain the tension of the 
movement? A social movement theorist 
Asef Bayat said that a key element of a 
protest movement was sustainability 
(Bayat, 2012), meanwhile, Hilman Latief 
when commenting on the Bela Islam 
Action movement stressed that the 
solidarity and protest movements had 
the potential to transform into a long-
term social movement if sustained by 
strong discourse (Latief, 2017: 213). 
 
In the frenzy of the ABI in 2016, 
several issues raised by ABI supporters 
cover many things. Beyond the issue of 
blasphemy, other issues with more scope 
appearing and being the subject of public 
discussion. Several things was debated 
include the issue of social justice, 
economic domination by certain groups, 
the arrival of thousands of workers from 
China, the rise of communism and, or 
rather the PKI, Western domination of 
the Islamic world, the efforts of others to 
destroy Islam in Indonesia and so on. 
The Bayat and Hilman theories can be 
used as analytical tools to see how 
effective the GAPAI and GNPF 
movements are, especially how when 
they gain momentum. Sentimental 
political discourse is a major challenge in 
the project of developing 
democratization in North Sumatra, and 
this political trail of hatred is basically 
not the first to occur in the direct regional 
head elections here at least after the 
reformation in Indonesia. Indeed, for 
regions with a pluralistic society the 
maintenance of social political harmony 
is not easy, development that is expected 
to create a democratic culture released 
from traditional ties turns out to have its 
own complexity. "Native Sons", "Native 
and Non-native Groups", faithful 
religious rules, and tribalism cannot be 
absent from the government agenda 
(Riza, 2011). 
 
The anti-Chinese riots of 1998 
illustrate how the peak of racism tensions 
here, then in 2008 when the North 
Sumatra governor voted Rudolf Pardede, 
a Christian served as a successor to 
Tengku Rizal Nurdin in the last half of 
the leadership period, wanted to run as 
Governor of North Sumatra 2008 -2013. 
Immediately, resistance from Islamic 
Faisal Riza & Junaidi, Islamic Activism, Local Politics, and Contradiction of Democratisation in 
 
6 
circles emerged, the anti-plurality 
sentiment maneuver appeared in the 
form of "Coalition of the Ummah", at that 
time. Furthermore, in 2010 at the Medan 
City Election event, when Sofyan Tan, 
one of the figures competing in the 
regional election event, this figure gained 
resistance from the Islamic community 
because he was of ethnic Chinese, 
Christian, and supported by PDIP 
(Indonesia Democratic Party-Struggle). 
As a result, Sofyan Tan lost to these 
identity factors (Aspinall, Dettman, & 
Warburton, 2011). Then, in 2018 there 
will be a regional head election at the 
provincial and district levels which is 
simultaneously carried out here. 
Incidentally, the figures who participated 
in this event were figures identified as 
people who were attached to the Basuki 
Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) figure, Djarot 
Saiful Hidayat, former deputy governor 
of DKI Jakarta during Ahok's leadership 
and returning in pairs in the DKI 2017 
Pilgub. Muslim resistance more and 
more because they assume that Djarot is 
a figure who is equally troubled when 
leading Jakarta, then, this situation 
provides new opportunities for Islamic 
movements such as North Sumatra 
GNPF and GAPAI SU to do long work as 
in the Ahok case in Jakarta. They built a 
narrative on three things at the same time 
which hampered Djarot's winning work 
in North Sumatra. First, the issue of the 
Koran defamation carried out by Ahok in 
Jakarta 2016, where Djarot was 
considered involved in it because he was 
a candidate for Deputy Governor of 
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, PDIP as his 
Djarot party also supported and backed 
Ahok. Second, Djarot as not the son of 
the region, Djarot himself came from 
Blitar, East Java, had been mayor there 
for two periods, then was assigned by his 
party to accompany Ahok in Jakarta 
since 2015. Third, Djarot in his 
participation as Governor accompanied 
by Sihar Sitorus, a descendant Toba 
Bataks and Christians who act as 
candidates for their Deputies. 
 
In addition to discourse 
fabrication, there is also discourse 
amplification through social media such 
as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and 
Youtube. The GAPAI network uses this 
means of amplification effectively and 
massively so that mass mobilization in 
every movement agenda can always be 
said to be crowded and successful. In 
short, here can be put forward the 
argument that this Islamic movement can 
last long and get support because their 
ability to produce religious issues and 
amplify them later in accordance with the 
mind and inner state of society, this 
ability also presupposes adaptation to 
social situations and political 
momentum, then, fabrication the issue is 
also supported by strength 
 
Elite Fragmentation Challenges 
 
The phenomenon of ABI from the 
beginning shows the symptoms of 
plurality and fragmentation of Islamic 
authorities in Indonesia. Rizik Shihab's is 
a figure who was proclaimed as a High 
Priest of Indonesian Muslims attracted 
many supporters and made it a new 
authority outside of figures from 
mainstream organizations such as NU 
and Muhammadiyah (Burhani, 2016). In 
addition, internally, as a movement in 
addition to strengthening work also must 
be able to maintain the solidity of the 
organization and management of 
conflict, when conflict fails to be 
managed, fragmentation and division 
cannot be avoided. GAPAI does not 
escape from fragmented experience, this 
situation can be seen due to several 
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factors, among others; first, the trap of 
political pragmatism. The sentimental 
political discourse of this movement did 
get public support and sympathy 
because it was seen as a sympathetic and 
Islamic action. However, if viewed from 
the typical problem or issue raised by 
this movement, it can be understood later 
that similar issues have always become 
political pragmatism. The large 
membership of GAPAI SU and GNPF 
(around 40 Islamic Organizations) 
basically raises some basic questions, 
especially about how they manage issues 
to maintain the tension of the movement, 
and the stability of the sense of 
togetherness, how. The polarization and 
plurality of mass organizations 
incorporated in this movement certainly 
cannot be simplified, and what is more 
be uniformed in terms of interests. The 
diversity of backgrounds and 
characteristics of Islamic organizations 
within GAPAI is a challenge for them in 
maintaining their cohesiveness, 
especially after demonstrations of 
increasingly wild political issues are 
characterized by mutual claims among 
elites about who has the most right to 
bring the aspirations of Muslims. As a 
solidarity movement, the power of issues 
is the key to maintaining cohesiveness 
between different groups to stay in line 
and transform the energy they have to 
make the desired changes. 
 
Second, the political pragmatism 
of this movement is closely related to the 
internal elite of the organization and the 
local political elite who have an interest 
in the regional head election. In Medan, 
during the solidarity movement of the 
Islamic Defendant Action in Jakarta 2016, 
a demonstration of solidarity that has 
been here since the beginning has been 
seen in the shadow of several figures 
which later ran for Governor. In the early 
days, among the political figures which 
were present at the demonstration was 
Tengku Erry Nuradi, at which time he 
also acted as Governor. His presence in 
this action could not only be interpreted 
as a presence as a Governor, but his 
arrival at this forum opened 
opportunities for interpretations of 
political opportunities which he might 
have achieved especially sympathy from 
thousands of demonstrators. Many state 
officials want to come in various actions 
but not all are accepted by the GNPF and 
GAPAI SU. One of them is the head of 
Police of Republic of Indonesia 
(KAPOLRI) Tito Karnavian. Up to this 
point, we can see that this movement 
seems very close to Tengku Erry Nuradi, 
this strife is increasingly visible when the 
rejection scenarios emerge from GAPAI 
and GNPF against candidates 
recommended by political parties. In 
short, this scenario is that they affirm 
themselves as channeling the aspirations 
of Muslims by the way any candidate for 
Governor and Deputy Governor who 
will be recommended by political parties 
must consult and get recommendations 
from GAPAI and GNPF. 
 
Then, during the election of the 
Governor of North Sumatra 2018 
entering the registration stage, there was 
an internal turmoil by GAPAI which 
responded to the decision of the Gerindra 
Party along with the PKS, PAN, Nasdem, 
and Golkar coalitions to support Edy 
Rahmayadi and Musa Rajekshah in the 
North Sumatra Pilgub. Gerindra's 
decision was apparently rejected by the 
North Sumatra Ulema Fatwa Guard 
Movement (GNPF). They even urged 
Gerindra to revoke its support for the 
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candidates for Governor and Deputy 
Governor who had been carried. The 
rejection of the GNPF was delivered 
directly by the General Chairperson of 
North Sumatra's GNPF, Heriansyah, in a 
letter dated January 6, 2018 which was 
addressed to the General Chairperson of 
the Gerindra DPP, Prabowo Subianto. 
Apart from the reason the candidate who 
was supported by Gerindra was 
considered as a figure whose helped 
degrade the spirit 212, another reason 
raised by the GNPF for the rejection was 
because of the joining of the "Religious 
Defiance Supporting Party" in the 
coalition. As is known, the religious 
opponents referred to by GNPF are 
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama alias Ahok, 
while the party which is considered the 
party supporting supporters of religion is 
the party that carried Ahok in the 2016 
Jakarta election, namely Hanura, 
Nasdem, Golkar, and PDIP. In his letter, 
the GNPF said that if the Gerindra Party 
still carries the recommended candidates 
at this time, then the Party would lose the 
trust of the North Sumatra Ulama GNPF 
and Islamic community organizations 
incorporated in it and the Muslims in 
general. However, along with the 
ongoing political dynamics, the political 
attitude of GAPAI and GNPF is 
increasingly not directed and very 
pragmatic. Previously they refused the 
pair Edi Rahmayadi and Musa Rajekshah 
but later they accepted. 
 
Another internal maneuver from 
GAPAI SU and GNPF is the efforts of the 
leaders to take part in the regional head 
election. There are those at the provincial 
level and others at the district level. At 
the provincial level, Rabualam as the 
chairman of GAPAI SU declared itself as 
a candidate for the Governor of North 
Sumatra 2018-2023. Rabualam desire as a 
candidate for the Governor had caused 
polemics in the internal GAPAI and 
GNPF. He was considered to have done 
so as something other than the 
organization's agreement and the ulama's 
decision at the GNPF, therefore he was 
considered to claim to be acting on behalf 
of Muslims for his personal ambitions. 
Rabualam itself believes that his efforts to 
declare itself to improve the welfare of 
Muslims that have not been achieved so 
far, Muslims have not been completely 
independent, he said. Heriansyah as 
chairman of the North Sumatra GNPF 
MUI nominated himself as deputy regent 
of the district of Langkat on the 2018 
post-conflict local election in the district. 
Once again, this move of Rabualam and 
Heriansyah is actually not too surprising. 
Because their dream of being a leader in 
the era of regional autonomy has long 
been embedded, Rabualam had tried 
twice the regional elections in Deli 
Serdang in 2008 and 2013, while things 
that were more or less the same also 
happened to Heriansyah. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Islamic movement which 
seen in the ABI volumes and having 
supporting organs up to the level of 
regional regions in Indonesia shows that 
Islamic solidarity is still a glue 
togetherness factor. Discourse 
fabrication, sentimental issues of 
religion, regionalism, and identity 
politics have become key factors 
supporting the survival of this 
movement more than many observers 
had expected. However, the movement 
of this model and the discourse they 
carry actually gives a sense of concern 
about the space for democratization that 
is missing. Forcing public narratives, 
sentimental, hate-based, and anti-
pluralistic political narratives, of course, 
seriously jeopardizes the development of 
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the democratization project in Indonesia 
because this project requires the support 
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